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The oceans have long been a critical arena for international relations. 
Before there was air travel and instantaneous communication, people, 
goods, and ideas traveled the world by ship. For centuries a strong mari-
time presence—both military and commercial—has been essential for 
states with great power aspirations. Today, even with advances in tech-
nology, seaborne commerce remains the linchpin of the global econ-
omy. As the International Maritime Organization reports, “more than 
90 percent of global trade is carried by sea.” And beyond trade, a host 
of other issues, ranging from climate change and energy to defense and 
piracy, ensure that the oceans will hold considerable strategic interest 
well into the future.
In this Council Special Report, Scott G. Borgerson explores an 
important element of the maritime policy regime: the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea. He examines the international nego-
tiations that led to the convention, as well as the history of debates in 
the United States over whether to join it. He then analyzes the strategic 
importance of the oceans for U.S. foreign policy today. The report ulti-
mately makes a strong case for the United States to accede to the Con-
vention on the Law of the Sea, contending that doing so would benefit 
U.S. national security as well as America’s economic and environmen-
tal interests. Among other things, the report argues, accession to the 
convention would secure rights for U.S. commercial and naval ships, 
boost the competitiveness of American firms in activities at sea, and 
increase U.S. influence in important policy decisions, such as adjudi-
cations of national claims to potentially resource-rich sections of the 
continental shelf. 
The National Interest and the Law of the Sea offers a combination of 
historical, legal, and strategic analysis. It illustrates how much of what 
the United States seeks to do in the world—be it deploying military 
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forces abroad or ensuring adequate supplies of energy—depends in 
large measure on the sea. The result is an important contribution on a 
set of issues that has been central to national power and foreign policy 
for centuries. 
Richard N. Haass
President
Council on Foreign Relations
May 2009
Foreword
ix
I am deeply grateful to the following people for helping me produce this 
report: John Temple Swing, Caitlyn Antrim, and Matthew Tinning of 
the Ocean Conservancy. They made significant and substantive con-
tributions. Brian Donegan also deserves special mention for crafting 
whole sections and helping in all facets of the report’s composition. 
His name deserves to be on the cover as much as mine. Of course, I 
alone accept full responsibility for this document and any shortcom-
ings or omissions.
I am also indebted to Ambassador Thomas R. Pickering, who chaired 
the advisory committee. He and the committee provided invaluable 
wisdom throughout the drafting process. This report also benefited 
immeasurably from the help of the following CFR staff: Patricia Dorff 
and Lia Norton in Publications, Kaysie Brown in the International Insti-
tutions and Global Governance program, Sasha Polakow-Suransky in 
Foreign Affairs, and Melanie Gervacio Lin and my research associate 
Erika Wool in the Studies Program.
This publication and my fellowship were made possible by the gen-
erous support of the Robina Foundation and the International Institu-
tions and Global Governance program. I am especially grateful to the 
program’s director, Stewart M. Patrick, for his support. I am honored to 
in some small way be part of the program’s important work.
Scott G. Borgerson
Acknowledgments

Council Special Report

3Introduction
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea—the instrument that cre-
ated the overarching governance framework for nearly three-quarters 
of the earth’s surface and what lies above and beneath it—has been 
signed and ratified by 156 countries and the European Community, but 
not by the United States. The Law of the Sea Convention, with annexes 
(hereafter in this report referred to as the “convention”), and the 1994 
agreement on its implementation have been in force for more than a 
decade, but while the United States treats most parts of the conven-
tion as customary international law, it remains among only a handful of 
countries—and one of an even smaller number with coastlines, includ-
ing Syria, North Korea, and Iran—to have signed but not yet acceded to 
the treaty.1
President Bill Clinton submitted the Law of the Sea Convention to 
the Senate for its approval in 1994, but despite numerous congressio-
nal hearings and even though the Senate Foreign Relations Commit-
tee (SFRC) twice recommended that the Senate give its consent,2 the 
convention has yet to make it to the Senate floor.3 The convention actu-
ally enjoys broad bipartisan support in Congress; has been endorsed by 
both the Clinton and George W. Bush administrations; is championed 
by the Joints Chiefs of Staff; and has been recommended by a wide array 
of interest groups in the United States, including the foremost national 
security, commercial, and environmental organizations.4 Still, largely 
because of the threat of a filibuster from a vocal opposition, the conven-
tion has yet to receive a full Senate vote.
With last November’s elections, the convention is once more in 
the news. The political balance of power has shifted in Washington, 
making the prospects of Senate approval likely. President Barack 
Obama, both during his tenure in the Senate and while on the campaign 
trail, expressed enthusiastic support for the convention. Vice President 
Joseph R. Biden Jr. was chairman of the SFRC when the convention 
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was last recommended for approval in 2007, and Senator John Kerry 
(D-MA), the new chairman, strongly supports it, as does Senator Rich-
ard G. Lugar (R-IN), the committee’s ranking Republican. During her 
confirmation hearings, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton stressed that 
getting the convention through the Senate would be a top priority for 
her State Department. And in February 2009, with Alaska governor 
Sarah Palin’s backing, the National Governors Association came out 
strongly in support of the United States joining the treaty.
The convention is also getting a close look as a result of recent events, 
perhaps the most dramatic being a serious confrontation in March 
2009 between U.S. and Chinese naval ships and Somali pirates taking 
a U.S. ship captain hostage in April. Piracy is growing exponentially off 
Somalia’s coast and is threatening strategic shipping lanes. The polar ice 
cap, melting fast and on pace to be seasonally ice free by 2013, is drawing 
attention as well; the relatively pristine Arctic Ocean is becoming open 
to fishing, international shipping, and the development of an estimated 
22 percent of the world’s remaining undiscovered but technically recov-
erable hydrocarbon reserves.5 There is a growing list of other emerging 
security, economic, and environmental maritime issues with important 
strategic implications for U.S. foreign policy, such as the rise of new 
naval powers like China and India, the delineation of vast amounts of 
ocean space on the outer continental shelf (OCS), and new commercial 
opportunities like deep-seabed mining. All of this is causing Washing-
ton to reconsider and reexamine the convention.
In many ways, the arguments surrounding the treaty are emblem-
atic of the broader debate about the role of U.S. diplomacy in the post-
9/11 world. Skeptics of the convention believe it is not needed, given 
the hegemonic strength of the U.S. Navy. And, they ask, why does the 
United States need to join this international agreement if it has gotten 
along fine so far without it? They also worry that the United States will 
undermine its sovereignty by incurring additional treaty obligations to 
international bodies established within the United Nations’ system. In 
a fast-changing world, with new threats confronting the United States 
all the time, this camp holds that the United States needs to be able to 
respond as nimbly as possible, unencumbered by lengthy legal conven-
tions that might restrict its freedom of action.
Supporters of the convention counter that the principles embodied 
in the treaty are the cornerstone of U.S. naval strategy and create the 
rule of law for prosecuting pirates and the growing number of other 
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threatening nonstate actors. They argue that the convention is impor-
tant for economic reasons as well, as it creates legal certainty for all kinds 
of commercial ocean uses, from offshore oil and gas to undersea cables 
to deep-seabed mining, that favor U.S. interests. They also argue, from 
an ecological perspective, that the convention helps the United States 
assume a leadership position for dealing with collapsing fishing stocks, 
pollution from land-based sources and ships, and the growing danger of 
ocean waste. Convention advocates highlight how oceans are, by their 
very nature, international and thus require a regime of international law 
and collaborative approaches to their management. They point to the 
1995 UN Fish Stocks Agreement as a prime example of how a carefully 
constructed international accord negotiated within the framework of 
the convention can provide for a legally binding conservation regime. 
Recognizing the utility of this specific fisheries management tool, the 
United States rapidly ratified this additional instrument as soon as it 
was possible to do so in 1996. Lastly, supporters ask that if the United 
States is not willing to accede to a convention that it requested, funda-
mentally shaped, and subsequently caused to be modified in order to 
address its own concerns, then why in a multipolar world should other 
countries follow its diplomatic leadership? In such a context, how will 
expressions of U.S. commitments to the rule of law abroad be heard?
This report will fully examine both sides of the accession debate: the 
wisdom of maintaining current U.S. policy of relying on large parts of 
the convention as customary international law versus now officially 
joining the 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea. It will outline the 
costs and benefits that would come from the Senate giving its consent 
to the convention. It will examine all the foreign policy dimensions of 
joining or not joining the convention, which are further elaborated in 
greater legal detail in Appendix I, and the strategic imperative of one 
course of action over another.
Given the extraordinary scope of the convention and the possibil-
ity of U.S. accession early in the Obama administration, this report is 
intended to give a fresh appraisal of this complex and lengthy interna-
tional agreement in light of the current geopolitical seascape, and to 
weigh whether it is in U.S. strategic interests to finally join.
6The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea is not a new construct; 
rather, it is the product of centuries of practice, three UN conferences 
(1958, 1960, and 1973–1982), and a subsequent agreement on imple-
mentation, negotiated from 1990 to 1994. Nor is the convention a new 
issue for the U.S. Senate. In force since 1994, the convention has been 
awaiting review since its transmission to the Senate by President Clin-
ton in 1994. For a decade and a half the convention has been pending 
Senate approval and has been the subject of debate between a broad 
bipartisan constituency actively working toward accession and a vocal 
minority blocking legislative action in the belief that it would burden 
the United States with additional international commitments. Before 
examining these viewpoints in light of U.S. strategic interests today, it 
is useful to understand the principal tenets of the convention and its 
historical context.
BR IE F H ISTORY OF T HE L AW OF T HE SE A, 
FROM HugO gROT IuS TO TODAY
Creating an international ocean governance framework has its roots in 
sixteenth-century European imperialism. As states increasingly com-
peted for trade routes and territory, two theories of ocean use collided 
head-on. On one side, Spain and Portugal claimed national ownership 
of vast areas of ocean space, including the Gulf of Mexico and the entire 
Atlantic Ocean, which the Catholic Church declared should be divided 
between them. Opposed to this were the proponents of “freedom of the 
seas,” a theory of vital concern to the great trading firms like the Dutch 
East India Company. Since no nation could really enforce claims to such 
enormous areas, and given the need of all the rising colonial powers to 
have assured access to their overseas territories, it is not surprising that 
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the proponents of freedom of the seas, the foremost of whom was the 
Dutch jurist Hugo Grotius, emerged triumphant. That concept became 
the basis of modern ocean law. 
Over the next three centuries, the concept of freedom of the seas 
became almost universally accepted, subject only to the exception that 
in an area extending three miles from the shoreline, or roughly the range 
of iron cannons of the day, the coastal state was sovereign. Its control, 
however, was not absolute. Vessels of other countries were given the 
right of passage through the territorial sea so long as such passage was 
“innocent”—that is to say, “not prejudicial to the peace, good order 
or security of the coastal state.”6 The nineteenth century witnessed a 
steady increase in ocean commerce, and freedom of the seas came to be 
qualified by the concept of “reasonable” use—basically, respect for the 
rights of others.
It was during the twentieth century, with its discoveries of impor-
tant resources, such as oil, and a sharp rise in ocean uses generally, that 
the accepted principles began to erode. Customary law, dependent on 
slow, incremental growth, could no longer move fast enough to provide 
generally acceptable solutions to new problems. Traditional uses mul-
tiplied. Both the world fish catch and the gross tonnage of merchant 
ships quadrupled in the twenty-five years from 1950 to 1975. However, 
the real spur to the seaward expansion of territorial claims had come a 
decade earlier with the discovery of oil under the continental shelf off 
the coast of the United States. That led President Harry S. Truman in 
1945 to proclaim that henceforth the United States had the exclusive 
right to explore and exploit the mineral resources of its continental 
shelf beyond the traditional three-mile limit.7
As frequently happens in international affairs, this action sparked 
reaction. The Truman Proclamation was soon followed by other unilat-
eral declarations. Chile, Ecuador, and Peru, for example, countries with 
only narrow continental margins and thus little chance of finding oil, 
countered by declaring seaward extensions of their jurisdictions to two 
hundred miles—thereby encompassing fisheries for species, including 
tuna, that were important to distant-water fishermen from other coun-
tries, notably the United States. That set the stage for international 
conflict that continued into the mid-1970s in the form of the repeated 
seizure, particularly by Ecuador, of ships of the U.S. tuna fleet based in 
San Diego found within the declared two-hundred-mile limit but well 
outside the traditional three-mile territorial sea.
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Unilateral extensions were also of growing concern to the world’s 
major maritime powers, particularly the United States and the Soviet 
Union. As more and more coastal states started claiming territorial seas 
broader than three miles (in several cases, as much as twelve miles, but in 
some, particularly in Latin America, far beyond), the maritime nations 
feared that their freedom of navigation on, over, and under critical por-
tions of the world’s oceans might be severely curtailed. They were par-
ticularly concerned that they would lose their high-seas freedoms in the 
116 straits, including those of Malacca, Dover, Gibraltar, and Hormuz, 
that, at their narrowest point, were more than six miles but less than 
twenty-four miles in width. If these 116 straits became territorial seas, 
the rules of innocent passage would require, for example, that subma-
rines operate on the surface, not submerged, and that overflight by air-
craft be prohibited without the prior consent of the coastal state.
The maritime nations did their best but failed to cap these extensions 
in two UN conferences—the first in 1958, and the second in 1960—the 
results of which were never widely accepted. By the mid-1960s, they 
were eager to try again, and they lent their weight to the growing calls 
for a new UN conference on the law of the sea. Their calls were not 
the only ones. Many developing nations in the Third World were con-
cerned about preserving international rights to nonliving resources 
beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. In 1967, these concerns were 
crystallized in a remarkable speech before the General Assembly by 
Arvid Pardo, then the Maltese delegate. Pardo was viewed sympatheti-
cally throughout much of the world when he asked the UN to declare 
the seabed and the ocean floor “underlying the seas beyond the limits of 
present national jurisdiction” to be “the common heritage of mankind” 
and not subject to appropriation by any nation for its sole use. He urged 
the creation of a new kind of international agency that, acting as trustee 
for all countries, would assume jurisdiction over the seabed and super-
vise the development and recovery of its resources “for the benefit of all 
mankind,” with the net proceeds to be used primarily to promote the 
development of the poorer countries of the world.8
Developing countries liked the idea for several reasons. First, since 
the value of the resources was then believed to be considerable, some 
thought it would lead to substantial development assistance for the 
poorest countries. Second, it gave developing countries a chance to 
become partners in, rather than subjects of, resource development. 
Developed countries also liked the prospect of a source of development 
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funds that, for once, would not be a direct drain on their treasuries. 
The major maritime countries also saw the idea as the natural vehicle 
to finally provide a counterweight to the seaward expansion of coastal-
state jurisdictions.
Whatever the motive, the concept of the common heritage was 
embodied in a “Declaration of Principles Governing the Sea-bed and 
Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction,”9 which was 
adopted by the General Assembly by a vote of 106–0, with the United 
States voting in favor and only the Soviet bloc abstaining. The declara-
tion called for the establishment of a new regime to oversee manage-
ment of this area and to ensure the equitable sharing of benefits, with 
specific reference to the needs of developing countries. A companion 
resolution called for the convening in 1973 of a comprehensive confer-
ence to cover all ocean issues on the international agenda. 
The stage was now set for the Third United Nations Conference on 
the Law of the Sea, which formally convened in New York in December 
1973. It was the largest international conference ever held, with virtu-
ally every country in the world represented, many of them relatively 
new and with no prior experience in dealing with ocean issues. There 
was even a subgroup to look after the interests of fifty-one landlocked 
or geographically disadvantaged states. In essence, the conference was 
charged with the formidable task of creating a comprehensive frame-
work for managing ocean uses that would be acceptable to the interna-
tional community.
What were U.S. objectives in the negotiations? On what can be con-
sidered the sovereignty front, preserving freedoms of navigation were 
paramount, but there were also a number of other objectives, such as 
threats to fisheries and marine mammal conservation; protection of the 
marine environment, in particular from the growing threat of vessel-
source pollution; and the preservation of the high-seas freedom of sci-
entific research. All of these, like freedoms of navigation, were being 
whittled away by claims of exclusive control accompanying the many 
extensions of coastal-state jurisdiction. To strengthen against these 
extensions, the convention sought the establishment of third-party set-
tlement mechanisms for disputes, particularly those over boundaries 
that were already being exacerbated by new jurisdictional claims.
On what can be called the deep-seabed front, there was the effort to 
create a regime to manage resources beyond national jurisdictions. The 
primary U.S. objective was to help create a strong, viable organization 
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that would be effective against the further-seaward claims of coastal 
states. At the same time, the United States wanted to ensure access to 
the deep seabed for U.S.-based companies on reasonable terms and 
conditions that would offer the prospect of a fair profit in the light of 
the technical difficulties to be surmounted and the large capital invest-
ments required for development.
How well did the United States fare during the nearly ten years of 
negotiations that followed? Most observers believe that, as a whole, 
the convention met U.S. objectives reasonably well, even though the 
Reagan administration, which came to power in 1981, concluded that 
defects of the design for a seabed regime would prevent President 
Ronald Reagan from signing the final convention. Certainly, on the 
sovereignty side, the final Convention on the Law of the Sea met every 
significant U.S. objective.
Most important of all, the breadth of the territorial sea was capped 
at twelve miles, while a new transit passage regime was created that, for 
all practical purposes, preserved freedom of navigation and overflight 
of the international straits. High-seas freedoms were also preserved 
in the three newly created jurisdictional zones beyond the twelve-mile 
territorial sea: the contiguous zone out to twenty-four miles, where a 
coastal state could enforce customs and immigration laws; the 188-mile 
exclusive economic zone (EEZ), which carried the coastal state’s juris-
diction over living and nonliving resources out to a total of two hundred 
miles; and the new archipelagic zones, which otherwise would have 
become internal waters of archipelagic states such as Indonesia and the 
Philippines, placing significant restrictions on navigation freedoms 
previously enjoyed in these areas. The convention also established pro-
cedures for extending coastal-state jurisdiction over areas of continen-
tal shelf beyond two hundred miles.
On the environmental front, the United States scored several impor-
tant victories. It got the conference to agree to international standards 
for vessel-source pollution. There would be only one set of standards, 
worldwide, with which all vessels would have to comply. At the same 
time, the conference agreed to maintain the traditional right of port 
states to enact and enforce standards higher than the international ones 
for vessels entering their harbors. That was important to the United 
States, since an estimated 90 percent of all shipping off U.S. coasts is 
on its way to or from American seaports. 
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The Reagan administration thought that, by and large, the conven-
tion had gotten it right. Indeed, it later declared that the United States 
would voluntarily abide by all non-seabed parts of the convention.10 
The Reagan administration’s objections were directed mainly at the 
deep-seabed side of the negotiations—the design of and the powers 
to be given to the new regime for governance of the mineral resource 
recovery in the area beyond national jurisdictions. The philosophi-
cal argument was that the United States should be able to go where it 
wanted and take what it wanted on a “first come, first served” basis. 
President Reagan would have preferred no regime at all governing the 
international seabed, but he realized that this was a fait accompli given 
the late stages of the negotiations. In the end, the Reagan administra-
tion declared it could accept Part XI only if certain changes were made 
in six areas having to do with matters like technology transfer, and if 
the United States preserved a de facto veto power in the governing 
organs of the new authority so that no financial obligations could be 
imposed on the United States without its consent. When these changes 
Source: The Commander’s Handbook on the Law of Naval Operations, www.nwc.navy.mil/cnws/ild/ 
documents/1-14M_(Jul_2007)_(NWP).pdf.
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were not made by 1982, the Reagan administration refused to sign the 
convention.
All six of the Reagan administration’s objections were fixed to the 
satisfaction of the United States in a subsequent supplemental agree-
ment that was negotiated and signed by most states, including the 
United States, in 1994. By now, it has been adopted and ratified by most 
of the original signatories to the 1982 convention.
BR IE F H ISTORY OF T HE L AW OF T HE SE A  
IN T HE SENAT E
On July 29, 1994, President Bill Clinton signed the Agreement on the 
Implementation of Part XI of the Convention on the Law of the Sea. 
He sent the agreement, along with the 1982 convention, to the Senate 
on October 7, 1994 (Appendix II). The following month, Republicans 
won control of the Senate, and in January 1995, Senator Jesse Helms 
(R-NC) became chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. 
Worried that the convention had not been fixed and that it sacrificed 
U.S. sovereignty, Senator Helms refused to hold committee hearings. 
In 2003, Senator Richard Lugar succeeded Helms as chairman and, 
with the encouragement of the Bush administration, put the conven-
tion on the SFRC agenda. Senator Lugar held hearings, beginning 
with public witnesses and followed by government and industry wit-
nesses a week later. In 2004, additional public hearings were held by the 
Armed Services Committee and the Committee on Environment and 
Public Works. A closed hearing was held by the Select Committee on 
Intelligence, which determined that joining the convention would not 
adversely affect U.S. intelligence activities. The SFRC prepared a draft 
resolution of advice and consent, and recommended Senate approval 
by a unanimous recommendation. The convention was sent to the full 
Senate, only to be delayed when then Senate majority leader William 
Frist (R-TN) did not bring it to the floor for a vote. 
Senator Frist declined to run for reelection in 2006, and the Demo-
crats won a majority in the midterm elections. With Senator Harry Reid 
(D-NV) as majority leader and Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE) taking 
over as chair of the SFRC, prospects for approval of the convention 
brightened. Letters of support from National Security Adviser Stephen 
Hadley and President Bush gave further impetus (see Appendix II). 
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However, Chairman Biden and the next ranking committee member, 
Senator Christopher Dodd (D-CT), were actively campaigning for 
the Democratic presidential nomination, and little progress was made 
during the early 2007 session of Congress. Eventually, testimony was 
taken during fall hearings, and the SFRC received letters from the chair 
and ranking member of the Armed Services Committee and the Select 
Committee on Intelligence, reaffirming their prior support of the con-
vention. On October 31, 2007, the SFRC again approved the conven-
tion by a vote of 17–4, and the official report and recommendation for 
approval were submitted to the full Senate in December.
By the late autumn of 2007, the convention had become a small but 
notable issue in the Republican presidential campaign. Senator John 
McCain (R-AZ), who had a decadelong history of supporting the treaty, 
changed his position and opposed the convention. By early 2008, the 
heat of the presidential campaign brought progress on the convention 
to a halt. Then, following the election, the Senate’s attention was taken 
by the growing economic crisis, precluding consideration of the con-
vention during the lame-duck session.
Under Senate rules, treaties must be reconsidered by the SFRC in 
each new Congress. While the committee must begin the process again, 
it will be able to draw upon the extensive hearings held in 2003, 2004, 
and 2007 to inform its next review. 
14
Oceans cover nearly three-quarters of the earth and have a profound 
significance to U.S. national security, yet they are often overlooked. 
Half the world’s population lives within fifty miles of a coast (and 10 
percent live within six miles). The oceans are marine highways, carry-
ing 90 percent of U.S. imports and exports, and most of the world’s oil 
passes through shipping choke points such as the Suez Canal and the 
Straits of Malacca. The oceans are a theater of conflict, a space in which 
traditional navies extend sovereign power, and a frontier where pirates, 
drug traffickers, and human smugglers proliferate. In peacetime, the 
ability of U.S. forces to navigate and overfly the oceans is a critical 
deterrent to conflict. The Law of the Sea Convention addresses all these 
issues and also includes articles covering traditional geostrategic con-
cerns, such as naval mobility and maintaining what the early-twentieth-
century American naval theorist Admiral Alfred Thayer Mahan called 
“sea lanes of communication,” the lifelines of the U.S. economy. It is by 
way of the oceans that the United States is able to conduct international 
trade and project military power abroad. 
From a maritime perspective, the United States is an island. Com-
mercial shipping is what carries the world to America and America to 
the world. Reverberations from Iranian naval provocations in the Strait 
of Hormuz in 2008 and recent piracy in the Indian Ocean off Somalia’s 
coast demonstrate just how critical it is to keep shipping lanes open. 
That is nothing new. The oceans have always figured prominently in 
American history, dating back to the earliest days when maritime links 
bound the colonies to the British Empire. Following independence, 
maritime issues were factors in almost every major diplomatic event, 
including the 1798–1800 quasi-war with France, which was essentially 
a naval contest; the beginnings of the U.S. Navy combatting Barbary 
pirates in the Mediterranean; and the Chesapeake-Leopard affair, which 
helped spark the War of 1812. 
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The list of other important maritime events in American history is 
a long one: for example, the repercussions of the North blockading the 
South during the Civil War; the sinking of the USS Maine on the eve 
of the Spanish-American War; the Great White Fleet announcing the 
United States as a world power; the maritime provisions of Woodrow 
Wilson’s League of Nations and the naval treaties of the 1920s; the 1940 
destroyers-for-bases agreement that sent fifty U.S. destroyers to Brit-
ain for use in World War II in exchange for land rights to British pos-
sessions; liberty ships, the now ubiquitous maritime containers (a U.S. 
invention); and undersea communication cables, to name but a few.11 
The oceans have been central to the American experience, whether as 
an arena for combat and struggle, as an avenue for the flow of commerce 
and people, as a source of fishing and resources, or as a wellspring of 
inspiration and challenge for Americans since the nation’s beginning. 
The oceans have served both as a moat, shielding a rising power from 
foreign adversaries, and as a bridge, linking the United States to the 
wider world. The oceans undergird international relations and have 
been central to the making of U.S. foreign policy. 
The oceans are vital to U.S. national interests for reasons beyond 
traditional national security. They shape the planet’s weather and cli-
mate. Oceans redistribute heat from the tropics to cooler regions (e.g., 
western Europe), which profoundly affects the habitability of those 
lands. They serve as massive sinks for carbon dioxide (CO2) emissions, 
thereby slowing global warming. However, they are in a dire environ-
mental predicament because, since they absorb CO2, they are rapidly 
becoming more acidic, making the marine environment less hospitable 
to the ecosystems that humankind depends upon. Dramatic human-
caused increases in nutrient elements (nitrogen, phosphorous, iron, 
etc.) that enter the oceans via rivers and air currents; the physical altera-
tion of coastal and marine ecosystems from development and seafloor-
disturbing activities; and the introduction of alien marine species into 
new habitats all have profound effects on marine ecosystems that are 
crucial to U.S. national security interests.
And then there is fishing, the greatest threat to the oceans’ ecosystem. 
From the early days of the cod fishery that supported New England and 
fed Europe to today’s $14 billion industry, commercial fishing is impor-
tant to the U.S. economy.12 The oceans, however, have now been fished 
to dangerously low levels and are at a tipping point, beyond which many 
fish stocks might not rebound. In just the last half century, fish, which 
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were previously thought of as an inexhaustible resource, have been 
reduced to alarmingly low levels. According to scientific studies, 90 per-
cent of large predatory fish are now gone.13 No fish stocks in the world 
have been left underdeveloped; nearly half have been fully exploited, 
about one-third have been overexploited, and about one-quarter are 
deemed to have “crashed.”14 More than a billion people depend on fish 
as their major source of protein, and a collapse in global fishing stocks 
would not only affect an important sector of the U.S. economy but also 
create conditions that would exacerbate existing political tensions in 
countries like Bangladesh, Indonesia, and the Philippines to the detri-
ment of U.S. interests.
As a result of these threats to the oceans and marine species and eco-
systems, the United States is being confronted by new maritime chal-
lenges. The ability to conduct marine scientific research throughout the 
oceans to better understand and respond to these challenges is crucial. 
The rapid degradation of the world’s coral reefs, population explosions 
of jellyfish, and toxic phytoplankton blooms are signs of mismanage-
ment that hint at unprecedented ocean environmental changes inimical 
to U.S. interests. For example, the Arctic’s sea ice is melting rapidly and 
is opening this relatively pristine region to fishing, international ship-
ping, and the development of nearly a quarter of the world’s remaining 
undiscovered but technically recoverable hydrocarbon reserves. 
The oceans should be thought of from an interdisciplinary perspec-
tive. They are more than a place of recreation; ocean issues include seri-
ous challenges for policymakers and real implications for U.S. national 
security. The oceans are vast, and the issues involved are so numerous 
that they do not fit neatly into any single official’s inbox. There is no 
ocean czar, nor, for that matter, is any senior official on the National 
Security Council (NSC) charged with overseeing ocean issues solely 
(although there is an NSC maritime policy coordinating committee). 
Ocean issues fall under the purview of the departments of Defense, 
State, Commerce, Homeland Security, Transportation, and Treasury, 
among others, as well as under the Council on Environmental Qual-
ity, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, and the authority of 
numerous congressional committees. Important to all but owned by no 
one, oceans and the policies affecting them have been adrift without a 
senior champion with the president’s ear. That is a profound weakness 
in U.S. governance, because ocean issues are critical to the country’s 
national interests and central to U.S. foreign policy.
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ARguMEN TS FOR AND AgAINST  
T HE L AW OF T HE SE A CONv EN T ION
Discussions of the convention should take into account the oceans’ 
historic importance to U.S. national interests as well as maritime chal-
lenges facing the country today. Whether the convention expands the 
rule of law or sacrifices sovereignty is the question at the heart of the 
accession debate. 
Opponents of the convention argue that there is no need to join the 
treaty because, with the world’s hegemonic navy, the United States can 
treat the parts of the convention it likes as customary international law, 
following the convention’s guidelines when it suits American inter-
ests and pursuing a unilateral course of action when it does not. They 
also argue that the convention is an unforgivable forfeiture of U.S. 
sovereignty to states that mean American interests harm. Supporters 
counter by saying that the convention expands the rule of law over the 
vast expanse of the world’s oceans and contains provisions that could 
actually extend U.S. sovereignty. They also believe that shunning the 
convention is a tone-deaf response to the spirit of multilateralism and 
that, beyond undermining specific ocean policy issues and freezing the 
United States out of the convention’s decision-making bodies, it tar-
nishes America’s diplomatic reputation at a critical moment in interna-
tional relations.
Debating the wisdom of whether to enter into international agree-
ments is as old as the nation itself. Stung by the controversy over the 
1794 Jay Treaty and the emergence of bitter partisanship between 
anglophile Federalists and francophile Democratic-Republicans (who 
felt the United States betrayed its French midwife when negotiating 
with the British in light of the 1778 treaties of Amity and Commerce), 
George Washington warned in his 1796 farewell address against “per-
manent alliances.” In the centuries that followed, two distinct camps 
emerged in the American foreign policy tradition: one was isolation-
ist, seeking to hide behind the Monroe Doctrine and remain aloof from 
corrupt, European deal-making; the other was more internationalist, 
seeking a more active United States in world affairs.15 Debates for and 
against the convention roughly fit within these two categories.
Proponents of the convention, who can be assumed to include 
almost all Democrats and moderate Republicans (by most accounts, a 
large enough bloc to achieve a two-thirds majority, as required by the 
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Constitution for the United States to join the convention), have been 
frustrated to date by a passionate minority that strongly believes it is 
not in U.S. interests to join the convention. Opponents of the treaty 
argue that the convention unnecessarily commits the United States 
to follow rules designed by states hoping to constrain American free-
dom of action. Their specific objections to the convention are crystal-
lized in the minority views submitted for the record the last time the 
convention was favorably voted out of the SFRC in December 2007: 
“[C]ertain provisions of the [convention], particularly those dealing 
with navigation, have merit,” but overall and especially in regard to the 
dispute resolution, “[i]t is puzzling why we would want to submit to a 
judicial authority selected by the United Nations, given the organiza-
tion’s corruption scandals, and the fact that of the 152 countries Party 
to the treaty, the median voting coincidence with the United States in 
the General Assembly was less than 20 percent. This treaty subjects 
the United States to a governing body that is hostile to American inter-
ests.”16 Other provisions found objectionable included “taxes” assessed 
to outer continental shelf activities; fear of judicial activism by the Law 
of the Sea Tribunal, especially with regard to articles relating to land-
based sources of pollution that are called a “backdoor Kyoto Protocol”; 
and a belief the convention will severely curtail U.S. intelligence-gath-
ering activities.
On an item-by-item assessment, however, these arguments are found 
to be lacking (Appendix I in far greater detail addresses the convention’s 
opponents’ critical concerns). With regard to dispute settlement, the 
United States has indicated that it would choose arbitration as stated in 
the draft resolution of advice and consent; it cannot be forced into any 
other dispute settlement mechanism. Specifically, Article 287 of the con-
vention reads: “[I]f the parties to a dispute have not accepted the same 
procedure for the settlement of the dispute, it may be submitted only to 
arbitration in accordance with Annex VII, unless the parties otherwise 
agree.” Under no circumstances can the United States be subjected to 
any dispute resolution procedures without its consent. Also, the con-
vention does not assess a “tax” but, rather, includes modest revenue-
sharing provisions from exploitation of oil and gas from the seabed 
beyond the EEZ that have been supported by every president since 
Richard Nixon, including Ronald Reagan. These resources were far 
outside any earlier claim made by the United States, and the agreement 
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to the modest payments was part of a package deal that included will-
ingness to recognize extension of U.S. control over the resources on 
the continental margin beyond two hundred nautical miles, which may 
encompass well over a million square kilometers of potentially exploit-
able minerals. That the payments are, indeed, modest is attested to by 
the support of the U.S. oil and gas industry for these convention provi-
sions. With regard to a “backdoor Kyoto Protocol,” Bush administration 
officials testified before the SFRC that the convention does not apply 
the Kyoto Protocol to the United States, either directly or indirectly. 
The convention’s provisions include no cause for legal action regard-
ing land-based sources of pollution; they only represent agreement that 
states are responsible for addressing pollution under their own laws 
and enforcement. Lastly, the heads of the U.S. Navy and intelligence 
agencies have testified before the Senate Intelligence Committee that 
the convention does not impede intelligence-gathering activities; on 
the contrary, the rights afforded to the United States by the convention 
significantly empower U.S. intelligence-gathering abilities. 
On balance, the arguments in favor of the convention far outweigh 
those opposed, which is the reason the convention has attracted such a 
diverse and bipartisan constituency. As presidents Clinton and George 
W. Bush forcefully argued in their written communications with the 
Senate (Appendix II), objections to the 1982 convention were substan-
tively addressed in the 1994 agreement on implementation. Continu-
ing to treat most parts of the convention as customary international 
law, as the United States does now, literally leaves it without a seat at 
the table in important decision-making bodies established by the con-
vention, such as the Commission on the Limits of the Continental 
Shelf (CLCS); weakens the hand the United States can play in negotia-
tions over critical maritime issues, such as rights in the opening of the 
Arctic Ocean; and directly undercuts U.S. ability to respond to emerg-
ing challenges, such as increasing piracy in the Indian Ocean. Joining 
or not joining the convention is more than an academic debate. There 
are tangible costs that grow by the day if the United States remains out-
side the convention. 
The majority view of the SFRC and the opinion of every major 
ocean constituency group is that joining the convention is in America’s 
foreign policy interests. Debating the merits of internationalism versus 
unilateralism is a great U.S. tradition, but the irony is that the convention 
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actually allows for an expansion of U.S. sovereignty: freedom of move-
ment for a powerful navy; a legal tool for U.S. forces to combat scourges 
at sea, such as piracy, drug trafficking, and human smuggling; and a pro-
cess for extending U.S. jurisdiction over a vast amount of ocean space 
equal to half the size of the Louisiana Purchase. 
As the next section of this report details, acceding to the conven-
tion would advance a long list of national security, economic, and envi-
ronmental issues of strategic importance to the United States. Beyond 
establishing the rules for territorial seas and exclusive economic zones, 
the convention establishes regimes for managing shipping fleets, fish, 
and pollutants that do not abide by national boundaries. The Law of 
the Sea Convention includes specific provisions guaranteeing free-
dom of navigation for merchant fleets and navies, and sets firm limits 
on jurisdiction to prevent “creeping sovereignty” by a few aggressive 
coastal states eager to unilaterally extend their authority seaward. The 
convention is used to prosecute pirates and is the basis for the Prolif-
eration Security Initiative (PSI) to interdict weapons of mass destruc-
tion (WMD).
In addition to these traditional geostrategic issues, the conven-
tion is also germane to a host of other ocean uses, some traditional 
and others new. It governs commercial activities on, in, and under the 
world’s oceans. With one-third of the world’s oil and gas already pro-
duced offshore, this is especially important, as the future of hydrocar-
bon extraction is in ever-deeper waters. The convention establishes the 
jurisdictional framework for rules governing this industry operating on 
the extended continental shelf. Deep-seabed mining is also an emerging 
industry, and the convention establishes, together with the 1994 agree-
ment on implementation, the legal regime for extracting resources 
from the ocean floor. The International Seabed Authority (ISA), cre-
ated by the convention, introduces chambered voting, a permanent seat 
for the United States in the executive decision-making bodies, and the 
power to block adoption of rules and budgets that are counter to U.S. 
interests. The convention is also crucial for helping to manage commer-
cial uses yet to be envisioned. Innovation and new technologies have 
played an essential role in sustaining U.S. prosperity and preeminence, 
and American entrepreneurs will undoubtedly discover future oppor-
tunities in the oceans.
The convention as a whole reflects traditional U.S. interests. It has 
been supported by both Republican and Democratic administrations 
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and enjoys the endorsement of major maritime organizations. Should 
the United States join the Law of the Sea Convention? What has 
changed to make accession so urgent? As the next section chronicles, 
a growing list of pressing maritime issues of strategic importance cov-
ered by the convention makes prompt accession to the treaty a U.S. 
national interest. 
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Immediate U.S. accession to the treaty is imperative to advance critical 
U.S. national interests. These stakes can be grouped into three general 
“baskets”: national security, economic, and environmental. Each day 
the convention is in force—and each day its various organs make ocean 
policy and set legal precedent—the United States is in effect marginal-
izing itself. It is also placing itself at a disadvantage by being unable to 
mobilize the convention to advance its interests through new initiatives 
or by means of the credibility that accompanies being a state party. The 
following paragraphs summarize the abiding U.S. interests in becom-
ing party to the Law of the Sea Convention.
NAT IONAL SECuR I T Y
To date, U.S. military forces have successfully protected American ship-
ping and the homeland from sea-based attack without the benefits of 
the convention. Why is it imperative to join the convention now? What 
does the convention provide that distinguishes it from existing treaties 
and the customary international law upon which the United States has 
depended for the past five decades?
In short, the convention provides the protection of binding interna-
tional law in four categories of essential navigation and overflight rights. 
Together, these rights ensure the strategic and operational mobility of 
U.S. military forces and the free flow of international commerce at sea. 
Joining the convention guarantees that 156 states recognize the follow-
ing basic rights of U.S. military forces, commercial ships, civilian air-
craft, and the foreign-flagged vessels that carry commerce vital to U.S. 
economic security:
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Right of Innocent Passage.  – The surface transit of any ship or subma-
rine through the territorial seas of foreign nations without prior 
notification or permission.
Right of Transit Passage.  – The unimpeded transit of ships, aircraft, 
and submerged submarines in their normal modes through and 
over straits used for international navigation, and the approaches 
to those straits.
Right of Archipelagic Sealanes Passage.  – The unimpeded transit of 
ships, aircraft, and submerged submarines in their normal modes 
through and over all normal passage routes used for international 
navigation of “archipelagic waters,” such as those claimed by the 
Philippines and Indonesia.
Freedom of the High Seas.  – The freedoms of navigation, overflight, and 
use of the seabed for laying undersea cables or pipes on the high seas 
and within the exclusive economic zone of a coastal state.
Further, the convention secures additional important rights for war-
ships, including U.S. Coast Guard cutters, and government-operated 
noncommercial ships, such as those operated by the Military Sealift 
Command:
Right of Visit – . Warships may visit and board vessels reasonably sus-
pected of being stateless or engaged in piracy. That right is critically 
important to ensure the legitimacy of many maritime security oper-
ations, including U.S. counternarcotic and antiproliferation opera-
tions, such as the Proliferation Security Initiative. 
Right of Sovereign Immunity – . Warships and government-operated 
noncommercial ships enjoy complete immunity from the jurisdic-
tion of any state other than the flag state.
The convention also provides the first concrete definitions—U.S.-
preferred definitions—of a coastal state’s territorial sea, contiguous 
zone, and jurisdiction in the increasingly important and often con-
tentious exclusive economic zone. The United States has previously 
asserted these rights and employed these definitions by relying on the 
protections of customary international law and the provisions of the 
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1958 Geneva Conventions. What makes these protections so vital to 
U.S. national security? Why now? What has happened to make joining 
the convention a national security imperative? 
The world has changed dramatically in the last half century, making 
the legal tools and protections the convention provides essential for 
the United States to shape and influence the security environment of 
the twenty-first century. The political polarization of the Cold War has 
yielded to a rise of both nations and nationalism. In 1958, there were 
eighty-two members of the United Nations; today there are 192. The 
North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the Americas’ bedrock national 
security alliance, has grown from fifteen member nations to twenty-six 
members and twenty-four partners. While the threat of international 
conventional and nuclear war has diminished, the transnational threats 
of WMD proliferation and violent extremism by nonstate interests 
with international reach have mushroomed. Expanding populations, 
combined with the growth of the newly industrialized economies, 
have fueled an increasing demand for and competition over natural 
resources. The energy security of the United States and every major 
world economy now depends on a global fuel market in which half of 
the world’s oil travels by sea, with most passing through a handful of 
strategic straits. Global commerce is the cornerstone of every nation’s 
economic security, with approximately 90 percent of both interna-
tional physical and electronic trade traveling across the sea in ships or 
under the sea in cables.17 
Changes in politics and economics have been matched or exceeded 
by changes in the physical world. Readily exploited reserves of oil and 
gas have been depleted. Entire species of highly valued apex predators, 
like tuna, and less palatable but economically critical forage fish, like 
menhaden, are collapsing. Meanwhile, a warming climate is opening 
the Arctic Ocean to navigation, providing access to previously unreach-
able resources and bringing about competing jurisdictional claims over 
this frontier. 
In 2008, the National Defense Strategy signed by Secretary of 
Defense Robert M. Gates reinforced the main tenets of the Coopera-
tive Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, issued in 2007 by the chief of 
naval operations and the commandants of the Marine Corps and the 
Coast Guard. 18 Both strategies emphasize that the prevention of war 
is the best way to achieve U.S. national security, and both highlight 
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the fact that a strengthened system of alliances and partnerships is an 
essential component of building stability, collective security, and trust. 
The Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower is aptly named 
and uniquely relevant when considering the question of whether to join 
the convention. Its main points are:
Preventing wars is as important as winning wars. –
U.S. maritime power comprises six core capabilities that emphasize  –
preventing war and building partnerships: deterrence, sea control, 
power projection, maritime security, humanitarian assistance, and 
disaster response. 
Expanded cooperative relationships with other nations will contrib- –
ute to the security and stability of the maritime domain to the benefit 
of all.
Trust and confidence cannot be surged; they must be built over time  –
while mutual understanding and respect are promoted.
Global maritime partnerships provide a cooperative approach to  –
maritime security, promoting the rule of law by countering piracy, 
terrorism, weapons proliferation, drug trafficking, and other illicit 
activities.
This strategy predicts that “increased competition for resources, 
coupled with scarcity, may encourage nations to exert wider claims of 
sovereignty over greater expanses of ocean, waterways, and natural 
resources—potentially resulting in conflict.”
 Why are the provisions and protections of the convention vital to 
implementing U.S. national defense and maritime strategies? Why 
now? All six core capabilities of U.S. maritime forces are predicated 
upon legally certain freedom of navigation and overflight, as defined by 
the United States and codified in the convention. Joining the convention 
supports the strategic and operational mobility of American air, sur-
face, and submarine forces. It provides legal guarantees for those forces 
to transit the high seas, exclusive economic zones, international straits, 
and archipelagic sea routes during times of crisis. It supports the free-
dom of those forces to legally conduct military survey, reconnaissance, 
and intelligence gathering under the terms and conditions the United 
States prefers. It allows the high-seas interdiction of stateless vessels 
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and illegal activities under frameworks such as the Proliferation Secu-
rity Initiative, using the protocols the United States carefully crafted to 
conform to the convention. Most recently, this year articles 100 and 105 
of the convention have been applied as the basis of an agreement with 
Kenya to prosecute Somali pirates apprehended in the Indian Ocean.
Implementing the maritime and national security strategies in the 
current geopolitical environment requires that U.S. armed forces be 
provided not only with the convention’s rights, freedoms, and protec-
tions necessary to facilitate military operations but also with the legal 
legitimacy necessary to build partnerships, trust, and confidence with 
nations around the globe. Currently, American armed forces are ham-
strung when the United States publicly solicits other nations to join it 
in enforcing the rule of law, while at the same time refuses to join the 
international legal frameworks necessary to establish such rule. The 
U.S. failure to join the convention has directly prevented expansion 
of the PSI with some critically important Pacific countries. Although 
these countries are supportive of U.S. counterproliferation efforts, 
they indicate that U.S. refusal to join the convention has eroded their 
confidence that the United States will abide by international law when 
conducting PSI interdiction activities. Remaining outside the conven-
tion risks further damaging American efforts to develop cooperative 
maritime partnerships, such as PSI, and undermining implementa-
tion of U.S. security strategies that require the confidence and trust of 
other nations.
Joining the convention would provide the United States with the 
opportunity to take a leadership role in the first truly global maritime 
partnership—a coalition of 156 nations committed to freedom of navi-
gation, the free flow of global commerce, the protection of legitimate 
sovereignty, the suppression of illegal use of the sea, and the peaceful 
resolution of maritime disputes.
Joining the convention would also provide important diplomatic 
tools for those times when the United States must act swiftly and alone 
to exercise its right of self-defense. In such situations, the leaders of 
states party to the convention may lack the skill or the will to positively 
influence their domestic constituencies that oppose U.S. actions. The 
convention not only guarantees nearly universally recognized legal pro-
tection for the movement of U.S. military forces, it also provides vital 
political protection for foreign leaders who must resist domestic chal-
lenges to U.S. use of airspace and water space within their jurisdiction. 
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That protection may prevent short-lived but necessary unilateral action 
by the United States from damaging long-nurtured international 
relationships. 
In short, the convention is vital to carrying out the president’s 
national security strategy, including serving as the underpinnings sup-
porting U.S. force projection abroad and the legal armor for safeguard-
ing America at home.
ECONOMIC 
The convention provides the legal framework for commercial uses 
of the sea. It establishes clear lines of jurisdiction for states to govern 
economic activity within their territorial seas and exclusive economic 
zones. (For example, whether the United States should lift offshore 
drilling prohibitions is and will remain purely an internal issue.) The 
convention addresses not only hydrocarbon exploration and extrac-
tion but establishes a government’s framework for all commercial uses, 
such as renewable energy projects like wind, current and tidal power, 
commercial fishing, and aquaculture. The convention also establishes 
a legal framework for international uses of the sea that extend across 
national jurisdictions. It guarantees the freedom of navigation for 
commercial ships and aircraft while providing for the prompt release 
of U.S. flagged vessels seized by foreign states. The convention also 
facilitates the laying of submarine cables, the information backbone of 
the world economy. And it provides the basic rules for conserving and 
managing transboundary fish stocks, further elaborated in the 1995 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement. While all these economic issues are vitally 
important, there are two that specifically create a sense of urgency for 
the United States to accede to the Law of the Sea Convention.
The first is benefiting from the rules relating to extending national 
jurisdiction over the extended continental shelf. Article 76 of the con-
vention automatically gives states exclusive economic rights out to two 
hundred nautical miles from their shores (determined from a carefully 
defined “baseline”). In addition, they can also assert sovereign rights 
over natural resources in the extended continental shelf beyond two 
hundred nautical miles if the shelf extension meets certain criteria 
as outlined in the convention. The convention creates a procedure to 
facilitate the process of a coastal state submitting claims over its outer 
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continental shelf. The office managing this procedure, the Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, consists of twenty-one technical 
experts who review a country’s claims to ensure that the bathymetric 
and geological evidence submitted meets the convention’s criteria. It is 
an orderly process, and the following states, in chronological order, have 
made submissions, some of them already approved by the CLCS: the 
Russian Federation, Brazil, Australia, Ireland, New Zealand, Norway, 
Mexico, Barbados, the UK, Indonesia, Japan, the Republics of Mau-
ritius and Seychelles, Suriname, Myanmar, and France. Because of a 
ten-year procedural clock that begins ticking when a country accedes to 
the convention, twenty-six additional states are expected to make their 
claims to the commission during the summer of 2009.
The urgency for the United States joining the convention is twofold. 
First, by not being a state party to the convention, the United States is 
unable to nominate or elect the expert commissioners who carry out 
the work of the CLCS. That reduces the ability of the United States to 
contribute to the work of the commission and ensure that the conven-
tion is applied fairly and objectively. Moreover, when Russia submitted 
what many considered an overly expansive claim in the Arctic Ocean in 
2001, the U.S. ambassador to the UN, John Negroponte, could only file 
a demarche listing U.S. objections. By not acceding the convention, the 
United States has no standing before the commission in what will be 
the largest adjudication of state jurisdiction in world history.
Remaining a nonparty also prevents the United States from making 
its own submission to the commission. The State Department is cur-
rently overseeing an effort to collect evidence for an eventual American 
claim to the extended continental shelf, but the United States cannot 
formally submit this package for review by the CLCS until it formally 
joins the convention. By not joining, the United States is actually giving 
up sovereign rights—missing an opportunity for international recogni-
tion for a massive expansion of U.S. resources jurisdiction over as much 
as one million square kilometers of ocean, an area half the size of the 
Louisiana Purchase. Remaining outside the convention prevents the 
United States from participating in the process of overseeing the claims 
of other countries to the extended continental shelf and from formally 
making its own.
The second major economic issue that makes acceding to the con-
vention urgent is the ongoing work of the International Seabed Author-
ity, which oversees the minerals regime established by the convention 
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for seabed areas outside national jurisdiction. The ISA’s charter, as 
amended in the 1994 Agreement on Implementation, governs the inter-
national seabed based essentially on free market principles. By remain-
ing a nonparty, the United States cannot fill its permanent seat on the 
ISA and is thus unable to exercise its special veto power over decisions 
on certain specified matters. U.S. deep-sea mining companies used to 
be among the world’s most promising, but they have withered away 
without the legal protection that would come with the United States 
being a state party. American energy and deep-seabed companies have 
been put at a disadvantage in making investments for seabed miner-
als projects by the legal uncertainty accompanying the United States 
remaining a nonparty. Furthermore, U.S. firms cannot obtain interna-
tional recognition of mine sites or title to recovered minerals.
The vastness of ocean space and the limits of our knowledge con-
cerning the oceans’ future economic potential also make it critically 
important that the United States plays a central role in the future imple-
mentation of the convention. The convention facilitates the conduct 
of marine scientific research to expand understanding of the marine 
realm. As knowledge increases and as technology advances, the oceans 
may hold enormous, and as yet only dimly perceived, potential. When 
coupled with America’s unrivaled capacity for technological innova-
tion, new ocean uses may become essential to helping drive economic 
prosperity for future generations. In the midst of a historic economic 
crisis, the United States needs to position itself by joining the treaty in 
order to secure its share of ocean industries of the future and the high-
paying jobs they will create. 
ENv IRONMEN TAL 
Protection of the marine environment was a core U.S. objective during 
the Law of the Sea negotiations. The ecological challenges that preoc-
cupied U.S. negotiating teams a generation ago, such as the conserva-
tion of marine mammals and fish, have only become more acute in the 
intervening years. One in three marine mammal species is now con-
sidered vulnerable to extinction,19 and it is estimated that the oceans 
have lost more than 90 percent of their large predatory fish since the 
advent of industrial fishing.20 The convention’s living-resources arti-
cles create a framework for international cooperation in the sustainable 
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management of fish stocks and the conservation of marine mammals. 
That framework has helped mitigate downward trends since becoming 
operational, and it offers the United States tools it could utilize for con-
servation ends if it participated in the Law of the Sea regime. The 1995 
UN Fish Stocks Agreement offers a prime example of how a carefully 
constructed international accord negotiated within the framework of 
the convention can provide for a legal binding conservation regime. 
Recognizing the utility of this specific fisheries management tool, the 
United States rapidly ratified this additional instrument as soon as it 
was possible to do so in 1996.
The convention’s provisions on environmental protection address 
all sources of marine pollution, from ships and waste disposal at sea, 
in coastal areas and estuaries, to airborne particles. They create a 
framework for further developing measures to prevent, reduce, and 
control pollution globally, regionally, and nationally, and they call for 
measures to protect and preserve rare or fragile ecosystems, the habi-
tat of depleted, threatened, or endangered species, and other forms of 
marine life.
Those facts alone argue strongly for U.S. accession. To answer 
the question “Why now?” however, a daunting set of comparatively 
new ecological threats must be considered. Climate change and the 
burgeoning industrialization of the oceans are giving rise to severe 
environmental stresses that require an urgent global response. U.S. 
leadership is critical, not only in undertaking the research that will help 
us understand the effects of climate change in the marine environment 
and related mitigation and adaptation options, but also in tackling the 
problems head-on. In many respects, such leadership cannot be fully 
realized without accession to the convention.
Oceans are among the first casualties of increased greenhouse-gas 
emissions. In preindustrial times, the oceans released an amount of 
carbon that roughly equaled the quantity they absorbed. But with rising 
levels of atmospheric CO2, the seas are being asked to absorb more 
carbon than ever before, a process that has already increased the acidity 
of ocean surface waters by approximately 30 percent.21 It is projected 
that global surface pH will decrease by a further 40 percent to 120 per-
cent by the end of the century,22 at which point the amount of CO2 in 
the ocean will exceed levels seen at any time in the last three hundred 
million years.
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 Acidification carries with it the potential to devastate ocean ecosys-
tems.23 It will deprive marine animals of access to the calcium carbonate 
many of them require, weakening the formation of calcium carbonate 
shells. Commercially fished species that will be directly affected include 
corals, mussels, oysters, lobsters, and crabs. More important, however, 
is the likely impact on many species of small planktonic plants and ani-
mals that are crucial to marine food webs. In short, acidification has the 
potential to transform ocean life, and its impact is already being felt by 
America’s marine environment.
A related consequence of climate change is ocean warming. The 
absorption by the ocean of excess heat in the atmosphere elevated ocean 
temperatures in the upper 700 meters by 0.1 degree Celsius between 
1961 and 2003.24 That ostensibly small temperature rise over such a vast 
expanse of water is, in fact, potentially devastating not only to ocean 
life but to life in general, because of the role ocean temperature plays in 
driving the planet’s climate. The oceans store huge amounts of heat and 
distribute it across the globe. Even small changes in ocean temperature 
will have consequences for how that process occurs. As the oceans con-
tinue to warm, both the frequency and the intensity of hurricanes are 
predicted to increase. Scientists also predict more extreme maximum 
temperatures and more frequent heavy precipitation.25
Change is happening most rapidly, and can be seen most vividly, in the 
Arctic. The Arctic Ocean is the least understood of all the world’s oceans, 
but we know it is warming at approximately twice the rate of the rest of 
the oceans. That is causing the rapid retreat of Arctic sea ice. In Septem-
ber 2007, the minimum ice extent at the end of summer was 23 percent 
lower than what it had been in 2005, the previous record low, and 50 per-
cent lower than was typical in the 1950s through the 1970s.26 Scientists 
from the National Snow and Ice Data Center and the National Center 
for Atmospheric Research have found that Arctic sea ice is melting even 
faster than models have projected, giving rise to predictions that the 
Arctic might be seasonally ice free as soon as 2013, and possibly earlier.
Such rapid change will lead to the local loss—or, in some cases, com-
plete extinction—of certain Arctic species. Ice-associated marine algae 
and amphipods provide the base of the unique food web that includes a 
rich variety of invertebrates, fish, and birds. Ice-dependent ocean mam-
mals, such as bowhead whales, narwhals, polar bears, ringed seals, and 
walruses, will also be directly affected by loss of habitat. The changes in 
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the extent of Arctic sea ice will also have profound consequences for the 
world’s climate, increasing the retention of solar heat and reducing the 
vital temperature gradient between the warmer tropics and colder polar 
regions, thus altering ocean currents and weather patterns throughout 
the Northern Hemisphere.
Attempts to mitigate climate change are the subject of separate inter-
national discussions. There is a strong argument to be made that acced-
ing to the Law of the Sea Convention would strengthen America’s 
diplomatic hand in those negotiations. Quite apart from that, however, 
the far-reaching changes to ocean ecosystems that are occurring as a 
result of climate change provide an answer to the question “Why now?” 
Full U.S. participation in the convention is vital as the international 
community adjusts to a rapidly changing ocean environment. The need 
to find ways to help humankind adapt to a changing climate will become 
increasingly important. Efforts to restore the natural resilience of 
marine ecosystems and species through their protection, maintenance, 
and restoration will be a central part of that effort. Given the geopoliti-
cal context of the Arctic region, U.S. leadership will be crucial.
The Arctic offers a particularly sobering environmental imperative. 
As its ecosystem comes under increasing strain from climate change, 
melting sea ice will expose it to unprecedented pressures that will 
accompany increased human access. Concerted international engage-
ment to ensure effective and integrated ecosystem-based management 
of human activities in the Arctic is essential. Acceding to the conven-
tion would help the United States advance new governance initiatives 
in this important region, such as shipping-traffic schemes through the 
Bering Strait, coordinated sea route authorities, and possibly even the 
establishment of a marine scientific park at the North Pole. The conven-
tion provides solid legal bedrock on which to build elegant and effective 
governance structures for the future Arctic.
As the Law of the Sea regime becomes more entrenched, the inter-
national organs it has created are becoming more important policy-
making centers. The continued absence of the United States from this 
international management regime deprives the United States of the 
opportunity to exercise environmental leadership over nearly three-
quarters of the earth. Joining the convention would permit the United 
States to become the main force for responsible ocean stewardship at 
this critical juncture, rather than see the fate of the oceans determined 
by other players.
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HOW REMAINING OUTSIDE THE CONVENTION  
DAMAGES U.S.  NATIONAL INTERESTS
The convention is now open for amendment and could be  –
changed by countries hostile to U.S. interests if the United 
States does not participate in the process. The terms of the 
convention require accepting the treaty in toto, and joining 
now would allow the United States to lock in an agreement 
most favorable to its interests—and also gain the ability to 
apply maximum leverage against other states on strategic 
oceans issues. The longer it remains a nonparty, the more the 
United States cedes its negotiating strength.
The convention provides two essential and immediate compo- –
nents for responding to piracy off the coast of Somalia. First, 
the convention permits any state to arrest pirates, seize pirate 
vessels, and prosecute pirates in the courts of the interdicting 
naval authority. Second, and equally important, the conven-
tion protects the sovereign rights of ocean-going states that 
participate in antipiracy naval operations in the territorial 
seas of failed states such as Somalia. This is critical for build-
ing international naval flotillas for combating the growing 
pirate problem in the Indian Ocean.
The United States cannot currently participate in the Com- –
mission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf, which oversees 
ocean delineation on the outer limits of the extended continen-
tal shelf (outer continental shelf). Even though it is collecting 
scientific evidence to support eventual claims off its Atlantic, 
Gulf, and Alaskan coasts, the United States, without becoming 
party to the convention, has no standing in the CLCS. This not 
only precludes it from making a submission claiming the sov-
ereign rights over the resources of potentially more than one 
million square kilometers of the OCS, it also denies the United 
States any right to review or contest other claims that appear 
to be overly expansive, such as Russia’s in the Arctic. This is 
especially urgent this year, as the commission will review an 
influx of claims expected in May 2009, the deadline for twenty-
six states to make their submissions based on the procedural 
clock that began ticking when they ratified the convention. 
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(The United States would have ten years to make its claim if it 
were to join the convention.)
As evidenced by the controversy surrounding the March 2009  –
confrontation with the Chinese navy in the South China Sea, 
the United States today forfeits legal authority to other states, 
some of them less than friendly to U.S. interests, that seek to 
restrict rights enshrined in the Law of the Sea central to Amer-
ican national security strategy, such as the freedom of naviga-
tion. Other examples include proposals by the European Union 
for mandatory insurance certificates to enter European waters 
and Australia’s pilotage requirements, both prejudicial to U.S. 
rights of innocent and transit passage.
As long as it remains outside the convention, the United States  –
is restricted from fully implementing the first-ever national 
Cooperative Strategy for 21st Century Seapower, jointly pub-
lished by the chief of naval operations and the commandants of 
the Coast Guard and the Marine Corps, which seeks to build 
maritime partnerships for combating emerging threats based 
on the principles established in the convention. The United 
States also puts its sailors in unneeded jeopardy when carrying 
out the Freedom of Navigation program to contest Law of the 
Sea abuses.
The United States cannot today expand the Proliferation Secu- –
rity Initiative with several critically important Pacific coun-
tries. Although supportive of U.S. counterproliferation efforts, 
these countries indicate that U.S. refusal to join the convention 
has eroded their confidence that the United States will abide by 
international law when conducting PSI interdiction activities.
U.S. firms and citizens cannot take advantage of the arbitration  –
processes established within the convention to defend their 
rights against foreign encroachment or abuse.
The United States is unable to nominate a candidate for elec- –
tion to the Law of the Sea Tribunal and thus is deprived of the 
opportunity to directly shape the interpretation and applica-
tion of the convention.
The United States is in a weaker legal position in the opening of  –
the Arctic to police new shipping, to contest disputed boundary 
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claims, and to challenge Canada’s assertion that the Northwest 
Passage falls within its internal waters.
American energy and deep-seabed companies are at a disad- –
vantage in making investments in the OCS due to the legal 
uncertainty over the outer limit of the U.S. continental shelf, 
nor can they obtain international recognition (and, as a result, 
financing) for mine sites or title to recovered minerals on the 
deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction. Even if U.S. firms 
were to unilaterally set out on their own, because the United 
States has negligible mineral-processing technology, they 
would have difficulty finding international partners to buy 
unprocessed minerals because they would have been obtained 
outside of the agreed regime.
The United States is unable to fill its permanent seat on the  –
Council of the International Seabed Authority and thus to 
influence this body’s work overseeing minerals development 
in the deep seabed beyond national jurisdiction.
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The arguments favoring the convention far outweigh those opposing it, 
and the United States should immediately join the 1982 Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. Of the treaties awaiting the Senate’s advice and con-
sent, this agreement is extraordinary in its implications for the national 
interest. As a result, the convention is getting a fresh look in Washington 
within the context of the current geopolitical seascape. The politics sur-
rounding U.S. accession have also changed with a supportive president, 
secretary of state, and SFRC chair combined with the likelihood of more 
votes in the Senate. The convention is now poised to receive the Senate’s 
advice and consent as required by the Constitution of the United States.
Driving the convention’s reappraisal are the substantive issues 
demanding action. An increasingly assertive Chinese navy, a spike 
in pirate attacks in the Indian Ocean, and the opening of the Arctic 
to international shipping and resource extraction are but a few of the 
pressing issues that give mounting urgency for the United States to 
join the convention. Beyond these national security issues, and from 
an environmental perspective, the oceans realm is in deep distress in 
many parts of the world, and no nation acting alone can remedy this. 
Collaboration on the basis of the convention offers by far the sharpest 
arrow in the international community’s quiver for responding, and by 
joining, the United States will gain a leadership role for responding to 
such environmental challenges.
In addition to the specific benefits to the national interest accrued 
from joining the convention, an internationally visible and successful 
bipartisan campaign that culminated in the United States joining the 
treaty this year could provide a springboard for a broader foreign policy 
agenda. Such a campaign would immediately
Enhance U.S. global credibility by matching action to rhetoric  –
regarding the rule of law. Joining this particular convention sends 
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a powerful signal of commitment to this principle. The undeni-
able semantic message of the title “Law of the Sea” and the practi-
cal effect of officially becoming party to a legal regime over the vast 
expanse of the world’s oceans combine to reinforce the strength of 
this signal. 
Convey broadly recognized legal legitimacy to U.S.-led security  –
arrangements, such as PSI and its counterpiracy, -narcotic, and -ter-
rorism operations at sea. 
Establish the foundation for strengthening existing international  –
relationships and building new partnerships. By clearly signaling a 
U.S. commitment to respect the legitimate rights of other nations, 
while reinforcing an expectation of reciprocity, the United States 
can dispel suspicion and remove resistance in a global constituency. 
Provide an array of diplomatic tools to address “creeping sov- –
ereignty” and the excessive, resource-motivated claims of some 
coastal nations. Arbitration will allow the peaceful resolution of 
disputes with convention party states whether they are friends and 
partners, such as Canada, Australia, and the Philippines, or poten-
tial competitors, such as China. When diplomacy must be supple-
mented by hard power to challenge the excessive and disruptive 
claims of any nation, especially those of potential adversaries and 
nonparty states, such as Iran, Syria, and North Korea, the conven-
tion will provide the United States with legal legitimacy and at least 
the tacit support of 156 party states.
Enable the United States to take a leadership position by acting within  –
the convention to help mitigate maritime disputes between important 
strategic allies, such as Japan and Korea, and in strategically impor-
tant regions, such as the Gulf of Aden or the South China Sea.
Expand opportunity for U.S. global engagement and leadership by  –
opening participation in the bodies and commissions established 
by the convention, especially the economically critical Commission 
on the Limits of the Continental Shelf and the International Seabed 
Authority, where the United States would become the only nation to 
gain a permanent seat and attendant influence. 
Strengthen U.S. leadership in combating maritime environmental  –
challenges of increasing urgency, such as ocean acidification, col-
lapsing fishing stocks, and pollution.
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More difficult to measure than what would be gained from U.S. 
accession is the diplomatic blight on America’s reputation for rejecting 
a carefully negotiated accord that enjoys overwhelming international 
consensus, one that has been adjusted specifically to meet the demands 
put forth by President Reagan two decades ago. Remaining outside 
the convention undermines U.S. credibility abroad and limits the abil-
ity of the United States to achieve its national security objectives. The 
treaty was negotiated over decades during which American delegations 
scored important victories. To the dismay of the rest of the world that 
negotiated the convention with the United States in good faith (and is 
now proceeding in making ocean policy and setting legal precedent 
in forums where U.S. influence is diminished), after fifteen years the 
Senate has yet to have an up or down vote.
The 1982 Convention on the Law of the Sea may seem an obscure 
agreement to nonexperts. That is not the case. The convention is a care-
fully negotiated international agreement numbering several hundred 
pages that covers a host of measurable national security, economic, and 
environmental issues of vital strategic importance to the United States. 
By remaining a nonparty to the convention, the United States not only 
forfeits these concrete interests but also undermines something more 
intangible: the legitimacy of U.S. leadership and its international repu-
tation. For example, American pleas for other nations to follow pollu-
tion and fishing agreements ring empty when the United States visibly 
rejects the Law of the Sea Convention. Remaining outside the con-
vention also hurts its diplomatic hand in other international forums, 
as well as the perceptions of other states about U.S. commitments to 
multilateral solutions. As former Supreme Court justice Sandra Day 
O’Connor has noted, “The decision not to sign on to legal frameworks 
the rest of the world supports is central to the decline of American influ-
ence around the world.”27
Given the unprecedented challenges, threats, and opportunities the 
United States currently faces, it is as important as ever at this critical 
juncture to strengthen American influence and diplomatic leadership. 
Historically, one of the underlying foundations of U.S. global leadership 
has been a perceived commitment to the international rule of law and 
willingness to build international institutions that create a predictable 
international order from which all peace-loving countries can benefit. 
Acceding to the Law of the Sea Convention will help undergird contin-
ued U.S. leadership, by sending a tangible signal that the United States 
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remains committed to its historic role as an architect and defender of 
world order. 
From this perspective, acceding to the convention is low-hanging 
fruit to advance a much broader U.S. foreign policy agenda. It has the 
broadest bipartisan domestic support; supplies the most direct national 
security, economic, and environmental benefits for the United States; 
and has genuine global reach. 
A committed political effort to join the convention during 2009 
will provide a highly visible demonstration to a world audience that 
U.S. leadership has the resolve to match words with actions, especially 
when domestic follow-through means expending political capital. 
Breaking the fifteen-year stalemate in the Senate on the convention will 
be a strong signal that the United States is committed to multilateral 
agreements, especially those whose development both Republican and 
Democrat presidents and a strong bipartisan caucus in Congress cham-
pion. Therefore:
1. The central and strongest recommendation of this report is that the 
Senate should exercise its constitutional authority by offering its 
consent for the United States to formally join the 1982 Convention 
on the Law of the Sea.
2. In doing so, the Senate should consider the carefully worded and 
painstakingly crafted text resolution of advice and consent sub-
mitted as part of the SFRC Executive Report in December 2007 
(Appendix III). This draft resolution chooses arbitration for dis-
pute settlement and makes other important declarations, under-
standings, and interpretations that safeguard U.S. interests. These 
details are not insignificant, specifying U.S. exemption from man-
datory dispute settlement in certain cases; requiring legislation for 
implementation in U.S. waters and to guide interpretation in U.S. 
courts; and preserving Senate oversight over any future amend-
ments to the convention. If the Senate takes the convention up 
again this year, it would also have another opportunity to revisit 
this text of advice and consent and could make additional decla-
rations, interpretations, and understandings needed to safeguard 
U.S. sovereignty.
3. For the reasons listed in this report, the president should consider 
making U.S. accession to the convention a leading foreign policy ini-
tiative in 2009. 
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Why is it imperative for the United States to join the convention? 
Why now? To fail to join the convention this year would be to lose a 
unique opportunity. The United States is experiencing a conjunction 
of circumstances that includes the “fresh start” effect of a new admin-
istration, the ascendance of two national security strategies founded 
on conflict prevention and partnership building, and a community of 
nations eager for renewed American multilateralism. By joining the 
convention now, the United States gains legal protection; for its sov-
ereignty; sovereign rights and jurisdiction in offshore zones, the free-
dom of maneuver and action for its military forces; and protection for 
economic, environmental, and marine research interests at sea while 
seizing an opportunity to restore the mantle of international leader-
ship on, over, and under nearly three-quarters of the earth. It is a bipar-
tisan agenda, and one in the strategic interests of the United States. The 
Senate should proceed this year and offer its advice and consent of the 
Law of the Sea Convention.
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The decision to enter a significant international agreement demands 
a thorough and deliberative review that appropriately generates a 
number of critical concerns. This section reviews the concerns most 
often raised about the convention and the rationale of the associated 
majority and minority opinions. 
Nearly twenty years of negotiation and renegotiation, the incorpo-
ration of substantive changes by the addition of agreements, and an 
execution mechanism under U.S. law that applies a resolution of advice 
and consent make understanding the legal implications of joining the 
convention a challenge, even for dedicated scholars. The fact that a well-
respected president opposed the convention citing “several major prob-
lems in the Convention’s deep seabed mining provisions”29 that would 
endanger U.S. interests has led a minority of public opinion leaders to 
persistently oppose accession. After these problems were addressed by 
the 1994 agreement and the convention was submitted to the Senate 
by two later presidents, some opinion leaders continue to cite concerns 
that the convention poses risk to U.S. national interests.
In its 1982 form, the convention contained “unacceptable elements”30 
that led President Reagan to declare:
“We have now completed a review of that convention and recog-
nize that it contains many positive and very significant accom-
plishments. Those extensive parts dealing with navigation and 
overflight and most other provisions of the convention are con-
sistent with United States interests and, in our view, serve well the 
interests of all nations. That is an important achievement and sig-
nifies the benefits of working together and effectively balancing 
numerous interests. . . . Our review recognizes, however, that the 
deep seabed mining part of the convention does not meet United 
States objectives. For this reason, I am announcing today that the 
United States will not sign the convention . . .”31
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The outcome of U.S. action to legally remedy the unacceptable ele-
ments, after the convention was adopted by the General Assembly for 
ratification, was a complex body of related documents. To completely 
comprehend the implication of U.S. accession in 2009 requires an 
appreciation of customary treaty language combined with an under-
standing of the integrated effects of the original 1982 instrument, the 
1994 agreement relating to the implementation of Part XI, and the pro-
posed Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent. 
ConCerns related to national seCurity
As developed in earlier sections of this report, the majority opinion 
holds that joining the convention will enhance national security. The 
most prevalent minority opinions cite concerns regarding detrimental 
effects on:
Military Operations. –  U.S. military forces are already legally bound 
to follow the provisions of convention by virtue of President Rea-
gan’s 1983 Statement on Ocean Policy; therefore, joining the con-
vention will impose no additional restrictions on U.S. military 
operations. Since the completion of the 1994 agreement, there has 
been unanimous support for joining the convention by uniformed 
and civilian national security leaders, including the chairman and 
Joint Chiefs of Staff, the combatant commanders, and the comman-
dant of the Coast Guard. The public record documenting historical 
and current support by national security leaders is overwhelming.32 
The most recent testimony of Deputy Secretary of Defense Gordon 
England succinctly captures this support: 
“President Bush, Secretary Gates, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the 
Military Department Secretaries, the Combatant Command-
ers, the Commandant of the Coast Guard and I urge the Com-
mittee to give its approval for U.S. accession to the Law of the 
Sea Convention and ratification of the 1994 Agreement. The 
United States needs to join the Law of the Sea Convention, and 
join it now, to take full advantage of the many benefits it offers, 
to mitigate the increasing costs of being on the outside, and to 
support the global mobility of our armed forces and the sus-
tainment of our combat forces overseas.”33
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Intelligence Operations. –  State and Defense Department officials 
referencing closed hearings indicate that the executive branch, 
responsible for collecting and the principle consumer of classified 
intelligence, has no concerns that joining the convention will harm 
intelligence operations: “The Convention does not prohibit or impair 
intelligence or submarine activities. Joining the Convention would 
not affect the conduct of intelligence activities in any way. . . . Our 
intelligence activities will not be hampered by the Convention.”34
The Proliferation Security Initiative.  – Similar to concerns related 
to intelligence activities, the effect of convention accession on the 
PSI is best addressed by those executive branch departments respon-
sible for its creation and execution. Ambassador John R. Bolton, 
undersecretary of state for arms control and international security 
affairs during the creation of the PSI, has stated: “I don’t think that if 
the Senate were to ratify the Law of the Sea Treaty and the president 
were to make the treaty, that it would have any negative impact what-
soever on PSI.” 35
The vice chief of naval operations has provided testimony that 
indicates joining the convention is necessary for, not harmful to, fur-
ther PSI success: “[O]ur failure to be a Party to the Law of the Sea 
Convention is limiting further expansion of PSI. Critically impor-
tant democratic Pacific countries have indicated a desire to support 
our counter-proliferation efforts, but they tell us that so long as we 
are not a Party to the Law of the Sea Convention, they will not be 
able . . . to endorse PSI.”36
U.S. Technological Advantage.  – It is true that the 1982 form of the 
convention mandated private technology transfer detrimental to 
U.S. national security and economic interests. That was one of the 
factors specifically cited when President Reagan rejected the con-
vention. Article 144 of the convention does encourage technology 
transfer, calls for parties to “cooperate in promoting the transfer 
of technology and scientific knowledge,” and remains in force fol-
lowing the adoption of the 1994 agreement but does not mandate 
technology transfer. Such transfer, mandated by Annex III Article 5 
of the convention, was eliminated by section 5 of the annex to the 
1994 agreement. Additional protection against national security 
damage through technology transfer is provided by Article 302 of 
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the convention: “[N]othing in this Convention shall be deemed to 
require a State Party, in the fulfillment of its obligations under this 
Convention, to supply information the disclosure of which is con-
trary to the essential interests of its security.”
A less prevalent but important minority opinion related to national 
security holds that the convention was developed with the participation 
of national liberation movements and these movements are allowed to 
participate as observers in the International Seabed Authority. Addi-
tionally, provisions of the convention that allow the distribution of ISA 
revenue to “peoples who have not attained full independence or other 
self-governing status” could be used to fund national liberation move-
ments. President Reagan cited such provisions as a specific reason for 
rejecting the convention, since they allowed the possibility of chan-
neling funds to groups the United States identified as terrorist orga-
nizations. While it is true that Article 156 of the convention allowed 
national liberation movements to sign the Final Act of the Third Con-
ference on the Law of Sea and to participate as observers at the ISA, this 
observer status conveys no authority or voting rights and is equivalent 
to the status such movements are already granted in the UN General 
Assembly. It is also true that the ISA could possibly decide to distribute 
economic benefits to such movements if revenue becomes available in 
the future. The U.S. safeguard against such transfers becomes opera-
tive through the interaction of the convention and the 1994 agreement. 
Convention Article 161, paragraph 8(d) requires consensus of the ISA 
council to distribute economic benefits, pursuant to Article 162. Sec-
tion 3, paragraph 15(a) of the annex to the 1994 agreement provides 
the United States a permanent seat on the council by virtue of being 
the largest economy on the date of entry into force of the convention. 
Together these sections effectively give the United States a “permanent 
veto” over distribution of economic benefits, hence preventing funds 
from being channeled to potential terrorist groups or other organiza-
tions likely to act counter to U.S. national security interests. Notably, 
the United States is the only nation with access to such a “permanent 
veto,” which is only available upon joining the convention. Accordingly, 
President Reagan’s concern regarding potential distribution of funds 
contrary to national security interests remains valid until the United 
States joins the convention. 
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ConCerns related to national sovereignty
The majority opinion holds that the convention extends the sovereignty 
of coastal nations in a manner that significantly benefits the United 
States. Some minority opinion leaders have expressed concerns that 
joining the convention will erode U.S. sovereignty by observing that:
Amendments to the convention may become binding on the  –
United States without the advice and consent of the Senate.
Article 316 of the convention has always required that most 
amendments be specifically ratified by a state before binding that 
state. The only exceptions to this requirement are for amendments 
to the Statute of the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, 
Annex VI, and for amendments relating to provisions on seabed 
mining. Amendments to Annex VI can only be adopted “without 
objection” per Article 313 or by consensus. In either case, the United 
States can block passage if necessary to obtain the advice and con-
sent of the Senate. President Reagan’s specific objection regarding 
amendments to seabed-mining provisions was remedied by the 
interaction of the 1994 agreement and the convention. Convention 
Article 161, paragraph 8(d) requires consensus of the ISA council to 
adopt amendments to Part XI, which contains the seabed-mining 
provisions. Section 3, paragraph 15(a) of the annex to the 1994 agree-
ment provides the United States a permanent seat on the council by 
virtue of being the largest economy on the date of entry into force of 
the convention. Together these sections effectively give the United 
States a “permanent veto” over binding amendments to the seabed 
provisions of the convention. Similar to concerns regarding distribu-
tion of benefits to national liberation movements, the United States 
must join the convention and claim a seat on the ISA to enjoy these 
protections against unfavorable amendments. Failure to join the 
convention and participate in the ISA risks “poisoning” the conven-
tion to U.S. accession by the addition of unacceptable amendments. 
Seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction are  –
designated as the “common heritage of mankind.” 
This language does appear in the convention and was not 
affected by the 1994 agreement. The convention uses this designa-
tion to establish a defined legal regime that will protect deep-seabed 
46 Appendix I
investment by providing internationally enforceable property rights. 
To administer these rights, the ISA is empowered to levy applica-
tion fees, review and act on claims, and then collect royalties from 
seabed exploitation operations. This process mirrors that used by 
countries around the world to promote exploitation of resources 
within the EEZ. The International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea 
is empowered to resolve some disputes related to Part XI of the con-
vention in its Seabed Disputes Chamber. While these provisions of 
the convention are undeniable, they do not aggregate to a loss of sov-
ereignty since the United States exercises no sovereign rights over 
seabed resources beyond the limits of national jurisdiction. These 
provisions provide a mechanism for private interests to acquire long-
term, commercially exploitable rights that could not be guaranteed 
under U.S. law alone. Upon joining the convention the United States 
will not gain control over deep-seabed resources but will gain unique 
and significant influence as the only nation guaranteed a permanent 
seat on the Council of the ISA. 
Dispute resolution mechanisms of the convention are binding on  –
the United States.
This assertion is undeniable. The United States will, by dec-
laration as detailed in the draft Senate Resolution of Advice and 
Consent, choose arbitration or special arbitration as the method 
applicable for most categories of disputes. That is consistent with 
many other international agreements, including the 1995 Agreement 
for the Implementation of Provisions of the Law of the Sea for the 
Conservation of Fish Stocks, which the United States joined in 1996. 
The use of such mechanisms is not considered a surrender of sover-
eignty by the majority. Some disputes specific to the resources of the 
seabed beyond national jurisdiction will be subject to resolution in 
the Seabed Disputes Chamber of the International Tribunal on the 
Law of the Sea. The jurisdiction of this chamber, by definition, falls 
outside areas of sovereign control. Finally, by declaration as detailed 
in the draft Senate Resolution of Advice and Consent, the United 
States will not accept any mandatory resolution mechanism for dis-
putes concerning military activities, including military activities by 
government vessels and aircraft engaged in noncommercial service. 
The sovereign immunity of U.S. vessels and aircraft on government 
service will be protected by the convention.
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Convention provisions that require action to control pollution  –
may be used to force U.S. compliance with international agree-
ments the Senate has not ratified.
It is true that Articles 194 and Part XV, section 5 require states to 
take “all measures consistent with this Convention that are neces-
sary to prevent, reduce and control pollution of the marine environ-
ment from any source” and “adopt laws and regulations to prevent, 
reduce and control pollution of the marine environment from” the 
land and atmosphere under their jurisdiction. Convention provi-
sions also call for states to reduce pollution by “the best practicable 
means at their disposal and in accordance with their capabilities” 
and to “endeavor to establish global and regional rules” to pre-
vent and control pollution. The majority opinion holds that these 
provisions of the convention only bind the United States to act in 
accordance with its own laws or appropriately ratified international 
agreements and cannot be used as a “back door” to compel enforce-
ment of international agreements the Senate has not ratified. 
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The White House, October 7, 1994
To the Senate of the United States:
I transmit herewith, for the advice and consent of the Senate to acces-
sion, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, with 
Annexes, done at Montego Bay, December 10, 1982 (the “Convention”), 
and, for the advice and consent of the Senate to ratification, the Agree-
ment Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea of 10 December 1982, with Annex, 
adopted at New York, July 28, 1994 (the “Agreement”), and signed by 
the United States, subject to ratification, on July 29, 1994. Also trans-
mitted for the information of the Senate is the report of the Depart-
ment of State with respect to the Convention and Agreement, as well 
as Resolution II of Annex I and Annex II of the Final Act of the Third 
United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea.
The United States has basic and enduring national interests in the 
ocean and has consistently taken the view that the full range of these 
interests is best protected through a widely accepted international 
framework governing uses of the sea. Since the late 1960s, the basic 
U.S. strategy has been to conclude a comprehensive treaty on the law 
of the sea that will be respected by all countries. Each succeeding U.S. 
Administration has recognized this as the cornerstone of U.S. oceans 
policy. Following adoption of the Convention in 1982, it has been the 
policy of the United States to act in a manner consistent with its provi-
sions relating to traditional uses of the oceans and to encourage other 
countries to do likewise.
The primary benefits of the Convention to the United States include 
the following:
Appendix II
T HE PR E SIDEN T ’S T R ANSMI T TAL DOCuMEN T 
TO T HE SENAT E, T R E AT Y DOC. 10 3-39, 
OCTOBER 7,  199 4
49Appendix II
The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a  –
global maritime power. It preserves the right of the U.S. military to 
use the world’s oceans to meet national security requirements and 
of commercial vessels to carry sea-going cargoes. It achieves this, 
inter alia, by stabilizing the breadth of the territorial sea at 12 nau-
tical miles; by setting forth navigation regimes of innocent passage 
in the territorial sea, transit passage in straits used for international 
navigation, and archipelagic sea lanes passage; and by reaffirming 
the traditional freedoms of navigation and overflight in the exclusive 
economic zone and the high seas beyond.
The Convention advances the interests of the United States as a  –
coastal state. It achieves this, inter alia, by providing for an exclusive 
economic zone out to 200 nautical miles from shore and by securing 
our rights regarding resources and artificial islands, installations and 
structures for economic purposes over the full extent of the conti-
nental shelf. These provisions fully comport with U.S. oil and gas 
leasing practices, domestic management of coastal fishery resources, 
and international fisheries agreements.
As a far-reaching environmental accord addressing vessel source  –
pollution, pollution from seabed activities, ocean dumping, and 
land-based sources of marine pollution, the Convention promotes 
continuing improvement in the health of the world’s oceans.
In light of the essential role of marine scientific research in the under- –
standing and managing of the oceans, the Convention sets forth cri-
teria and procedures to promote access to marine areas, including 
coastal waters, for research activities.
The Convention facilitates solutions to the increasingly complex  –
problems of the uses of the ocean—solutions that respect the 
essential balance between our interests as both a coastal and a mar-
itime nation.
Through its dispute settlement provisions, the Convention provides  –
for mechanisms to enhance compliance by Parties with the Conven-
tion’s provisions.
Notwithstanding these beneficial provisions of the Convention and 
bipartisan support for them, the United States decided not to sign the 
Convention in 1982 because of flaws in the regime it would have estab-
lished for managing the development of mineral resources of the seabed 
beyond national jurisdiction (Part XI). It has been the consistent view 
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of successive U.S. Administrations that this deep seabed mining regime 
was inadequate and in need of reform if the United States was ever to 
become a Party to the Convention.
Such reform has now been achieved. The Agreement, signed by the 
United States on July 29, 1994, fundamentally changes the deep seabed 
mining regime of the Convention. As described in the report of the Sec-
retary of State, the Agreement meets the objections the United States 
and other industrialized nations previously expressed to Part XI. It 
promises to provide a stable and internationally recognized framework 
for mining to proceed in response to future demand for minerals.
Early adherence by the United States to the Convention and the 
Agreement is important to maintain a stable legal regime for all uses of 
the sea, which covers more than 70 percent of the surface of the globe. 
Maintenance of such stability is vital to U.S. national security and eco-
nomic strength.
I therefore recommend that the Senate give early and favorable con-
sideration to the Convention and to the Agreement and give its advice 
and consent to accession to the Convention and to ratification of the 
Agreement. Should the Senate give such advice and consent, I intend 
to exercise the options concerning dispute settlement recommended in 
the accompanying report of the Secretary of State.
WILLIAM J. CLINTON
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STAT EMEN T BY T HE PR E SIDEN T
THE WHITE HOUSE 
Office of the Press Secretary 
For Immediate Release
May 15, 2007 
I am acting to advance U.S. interests in the world’s oceans in two impor-
tant ways.
First, I urge the Senate to act favorably on U.S. accession to the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea during this ses-
sion of Congress. Joining will serve the national security interests of 
the United States, including the maritime mobility of our armed forces 
worldwide. It will secure U.S. sovereign rights over extensive marine 
areas, including the valuable natural resources they contain. Accession 
will promote U.S. interests in the environmental health of the oceans. 
And it will give the United States a seat at the table when the rights that 
are vital to our interests are debated and interpreted.
Second, I have instructed the U.S. delegation to the International 
Maritime Organization (IMO) to submit a proposal for international 
measures that would enhance protection of the Papahanaumokuakea 
Marine National Monument, the area including the Northwestern 
Hawaiian Islands.
Last June, I issued a proclamation establishing the Monument, a 
1,200-mile stretch of coral islands, seamounts, banks, and shoals that 
are home to some 7,000 marine species. The United States will propose 
that the IMO designate the entire area as a Particularly Sensitive Sea 
Area (PSSA)—similar to areas such as the Florida Keys, the Great Bar-
rier Reef, and the Galapagos Archipelago—which will alert mariners to 
exercise caution in the ecologically important, sensitive, and hazardous 
area they are entering. This proposal, like the Convention on the Law 
of the Sea, will help protect the maritime environment while preserv-
ing the navigational freedoms essential to the security and economy of 
every nation.
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Resolved (two-thirds of the Senators present concurring therein), 
seCtion 1. senate adviCe and Consent suBJeCt to 
deClarations and understandings. 
The Senate advises and consents to the accession to the United Nations 
Convention on the Law of the Sea, with annexes, adopted on December 
10, 1982 (hereafter in this resolution referred to as the ‘‘Convention’’), 
and to the ratification of the Agreement Relating to the Implementa-
tion of Part XI of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the 
Sea, with annex, adopted on July 28, 1994 (hereafter in this resolution 
referred to as the ‘‘Agreement’’) (T.Doc. 103–39), subject to the declara-
tions of section 2, to be made under articles 287 and 298 of the Conven-
tion, the declarations and understandings of section 3, to be made under 
article 310 of the Convention, and the conditions of section 4. 
seCtion 2. deClarations under artiCles 287  
and 298. 
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the 
following declarations: 
(1) The Government of the United States of America declares, in 
accordance with article 287(1), that it chooses the following means for 
the settlement of disputes concerning the interpretation or application 
of the Convention: 
(A) a special arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance 
with Annex VIII for the settlement of disputes concerning the 
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interpretation or application of the articles of the Convention 
relating to (1) fisheries, (2) protection and preservation of the 
marine environment, (3) marine scientific research, and (4) navi-
gation, including pollution from vessels and by dumping; and 
(B) an arbitral tribunal constituted in accordance with Annex 
VII for the settlement of disputes not covered by the declaration 
in subparagraph (A). 
(2) The Government of the United States of America declares, in 
accordance with article 298(1), that it does not accept any of the pro-
cedures provided for in section 2 of Part XV (including, inter alia, the 
Seabed Disputes Chamber procedure referred to in article 287(2)) 
with respect to the categories of disputes set forth in sub-paragraphs 
(a), (b), and (c) of article 298(1). The United States further declares 
that its consent to accession to the Convention is conditioned upon 
the understanding that, under article 298(1)(b), each State Party has 
the exclusive right to determine whether its activities are or were 
‘‘military activities’’ and that such determinations are not subject 
to review. 
seCtion 3. otHer deClarations and 
understandings under artiCle 310. 
The advice and consent of the Senate under section 1 is subject to the 
following declarations and understandings: 
(1) The United States understands that nothing in the Convention, 
including any provisions referring to ‘‘peaceful uses’’ or ‘‘peaceful pur-
poses,’’ impairs the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense 
or rights during armed conflict. 
(2) The United States understands, with respect to the right of inno-
cent passage under the Convention, that— 
(A) all ships, including warships, regardless of, for example, 
cargo, armament, means of propulsion, flag, origin, destination, 
or purpose, enjoy the right of innocent passage; 
(B) article 19(2) contains an exhaustive list of activities that 
render passage non-innocent; 
(C) any determination of non-innocence of passage by a ship 
must be made on the basis of acts it commits while in the territo-
rial sea, and not on the basis of, for example, cargo, armament, 
means of propulsion, flag, origin, destination, or purpose; and 
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(D) the Convention does not authorize a coastal State to con-
dition the exercise of the right of innocent passage by any ships, 
including warships, on the giving of prior notification to or the 
receipt of prior permission from the coastal State. 
(3) The United States understands, concerning Parts III and IV of the 
Convention, that— 
(A) all ships and aircraft, including warships and military air-
craft, regardless of, for example, cargo, armament, means of 
propulsion, flag, origin, destination, or purpose, are entitled to 
transit passage and archipelagic sea lanes passage in their ‘‘normal 
mode’’; 
(B) ‘‘normal mode’’ includes, inter alia— 
(i) submerged transit of submarines; 
(ii) overflight by military aircraft, including in military 
formation; 
(iii) activities necessary for the security of surface war-
ships, such as formation steaming and other force protec-
tion measures; 
(iv) underway replenishment; and 
(v) the launching and recovery of aircraft; 
(C) the words ‘‘strait’’ and ‘‘straits’’ are not limited by geo-
graphic names or categories and include all waters not subject to 
Part IV that separate one part of the high seas or exclusive eco-
nomic zone from another part of the high seas or exclusive eco-
nomic zone or other areas referred to in article 45; 
(D) the term ‘‘used for international navigation’’ includes all 
straits capable of being used for international navigation; and 
(E) the right of archipelagic sea lanes passage is not dependent 
upon the designation by archipelagic States of specific sea lanes 
and/or air routes and, in the absence of such designation or if there 
has been only a partial designation, may be exercised through all 
routes normally used for international navigation. 
(4) The United States understands, with respect to the exclusive eco-
nomic zone, that— 
(A) all States enjoy high seas freedoms of navigation and over-
flight and all other internationally lawful uses of the sea related 
to these freedoms, including, inter alia, military activities, such as 
anchoring, launching and landing of aircraft and other military 
devices, launching and recovering water-borne craft, operating 
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military devices, intelligence collection, surveillance and recon-
naissance activities, exercises, operations, and conducting mili-
tary surveys; and 
(B) coastal State actions pertaining to these freedoms and uses 
must be in accordance with the Convention. 
(5) The United States understands that ‘‘marine scientific research’’ 
does not include, inter alia— 
(A) prospecting and exploration of natural resources; 
(B) hydrographic surveys; 
(C) military activities, including military surveys; 
(D) environmental monitoring and assessment pursuant to 
section 4 of Part XII; or 
(E) activities related to submerged wrecks or objects of an 
archaeological and historical nature. 
(6) The United States understands that any declaration or statement 
purporting to limit navigation, overflight, or other rights and freedoms 
of all States in ways not permitted by the Convention contravenes the 
Convention. Lack of a response by the United States to a particular dec-
laration or statement made under the Convention shall not be inter-
preted as tacit acceptance by the United States of that declaration or 
statement. 
(7) The United States understands that nothing in the Convention 
limits the ability of a State to prohibit or restrict imports of goods into 
its territory in order to, inter alia, promote or require compliance with 
environmental and conservation laws, norms, and objectives. 
(8) The United States understands that articles 220, 228, and 230 
apply only to pollution from vessels (as referred to in article 211) and 
not, for example, to pollution from dumping. 
(9) The United States understands, with respect to articles 220 and 
226, that the ‘‘clear grounds’’ requirement set forth in those articles is 
equivalent to the ‘‘reasonable suspicion’’ standard under United States 
law. 
(10) The United States understands, with respect to article 228(2), 
that— 
(A) the ‘‘proceedings’’ referred to in that paragraph are the 
same as those referred to in article 228(1), namely those proceed-
ings in respect of any violation of applicable laws and regulations 
or international rules and standards relating to the prevention, 
reduction and control of pollution from vessels committed by a 
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foreign vessel beyond the territorial sea of the State instituting 
proceedings; and 
(B) fraudulent concealment from an officer of the United States 
of information concerning such pollution would extend the three-
year period in which such proceedings may be instituted. 
(11) The United States understands, with respect to article 230, 
that— 
(A) it applies only to natural persons aboard the foreign vessels 
at the time of the act of pollution; 
(B) the references to ‘‘monetary penalties only’’ exclude only 
imprisonment and corporal punishment; 
(C) the requirement that an act of pollution be ‘‘willful’’ in order 
to impose non-monetary penalties would not constrain the impo-
sition of such penalties for pollution caused by gross negligence; 
(D) in determining what constitutes a ‘‘serious’’ act of pol-
lution, a State may consider, as appropriate, the cumulative or 
aggregate impact on the marine environment of repeated acts of 
pollution over time; and 
(E) among the factors relevant to the determination whether 
an act of pollution is ‘‘serious,’’ a significant factor is non-compli-
ance with a generally accepted international rule or standard. 
(12) The United States understands that sections 6 and 7 of Part XII 
do not limit the authority of a State to impose penalties, monetary or 
non-monetary, for, inter alia— 
(A) non-pollution offenses, such as false statements, obstruc-
tion of justice, and obstruction of government or judicial proceed-
ings, wherever they occur; or 
(B) any violation of national laws and regulations or applicable 
international rules and standards for the prevention, reduction 
and control of pollution of the marine environment that occurs 
while a foreign vessel is in any of its ports, rivers, harbors, or off-
shore terminals. 
(13) The United States understands that the Convention recognizes 
and does not constrain the longstanding sovereign right of a State to 
impose and enforce conditions for the entry of foreign vessels into its 
ports, rivers, harbors, or offshore terminals, such as a requirement 
that ships exchange ballast water beyond 200 nautical miles from 
shore or a requirement that tank vessels carrying oil be constructed 
with double hulls. 
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(14) The United States understands, with respect to article 21(2), 
that measures applying to the ‘‘design, construction, equipment or 
manning’’ do not include, inter alia, measures such as traffic separa-
tion schemes, ship routing measures, speed limits, quantitative restric-
tions on discharge of substances, restrictions on the discharge and/or 
uptake of ballast water, reporting requirements, and record-keeping 
requirements. 
(15) The United States understands that the Convention supports a 
coastal State’s exercise of its domestic authority to regulate discharges 
into the marine environment resulting from industrial operations on 
board a foreign vessel. 
(16) The United States understands that the Convention supports a 
coastal State’s exercise of its domestic authority to regulate the intro-
duction into the marine environment of alien or new species. 
(17) The United States understands that, with respect to articles 61 
and 62, a coastal State has the exclusive right to determine the allowable 
catch of the living resources in its exclusive economic zone, whether it 
has the capacity to harvest the entire allowable catch, whether any sur-
plus exists for allocation to other States, and to establish the terms and 
conditions under which access may be granted. The United States fur-
ther understands that such determinations are, by virtue of article 297(3)
(a), not subject to binding dispute resolution under the Convention. 
(18) The United States understands that article 65 of the Convention 
lent direct support to the establishment of the moratorium on commer-
cial whaling, supports the creation of sanctuaries and other conserva-
tion measures, and requires States to cooperate not only with respect to 
large whales, but with respect to all cetaceans. 
(19) The United States understands that, with respect to article 33, 
the term ‘‘sanitary laws and regulations’’ includes laws and regulations 
to protect human health from, inter alia, pathogens being introduced 
into the territorial sea. 
(20) The United States understands that decisions of the Council 
pursuant to procedures other than those set forth in article 161(8)(d) 
will involve administrative, institutional, or procedural matters and will 
not result in substantive obligations on the United States. 
(21) The United States understands that decisions of the Assembly 
under article 160(2)(e) to assess the contributions of members are to 
be taken pursuant to section 3(7) of the Annex to the Agreement and 
that the United States will, pursuant to section 9(3) of the Annex to the 
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Agreement, be guaranteed a seat on the Finance Committee established 
by section 9(1) of the Annex to the Agreement, so long as the Authority 
supports itself through assessed contributions. 
(22) The United States declares, pursuant to article 39 of Annex VI, 
that decisions of the Seabed Disputes Chamber shall be enforceable in 
the territory of the United States only in accordance with procedures 
established by implementing legislation and that such decisions shall 
be subject to such legal and factual review as is constitutionally required 
and without precedential effect in any court of the United States. 
(23) The United States— 
(A) understands that article 161(8)(f) applies to the Council’s 
approval of amendments to section 4 of Annex VI; 
(B) declares that, under that article, it intends to accept only 
a procedure that requires consensus for the adoption of amend-
ments to section 4 of Annex VI; and 
(C) in the case of an amendment to section 4 of Annex VI that 
is adopted contrary to this understanding, that is, by a proce-
dure other than consensus, will consider itself bound by such an 
amendment only if it subsequently ratifies such amendment pur-
suant to the advice and consent of the Senate. 
(24) The United States declares that, with the exception of articles 
177–183, article 13 of Annex IV, and article 10 of Annex VI, the provi-
sions of the Convention and the Agreement, including amendments 
thereto and rules, regulations, and procedures thereunder, are not self-
executing. 
seCtion 4. Conditions. 
(a) IN GENERAL.—The advice and consent of the Senate under sec-
tion 1 is subject to the following conditions: 
(1) Not later than 15 days after the receipt by the Secretary of State 
of a written communication from the Secretary-General of the United 
Nations or the Secretary-General of the Authority transmitting a pro-
posal to amend the Convention pursuant to article 312, 313, or 314, the 
President shall submit to the Committee on Foreign Relations of the 
Senate a copy of the proposed amendment. 
(2) Prior to the convening of a Conference to consider amendments 
to the Convention proposed to be adopted pursuant to article 312 of 
the Convention, the President shall consult with the Committee on 
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Foreign Relations of the Senate on the amendments to be considered at 
the Conference. The President shall also consult with the Committee 
on Foreign Relations of the Senate on any amendment proposed to be 
adopted pursuant to article 313 of the Convention. 
(3) Not later than 15 days prior to any meeting— 
(A) of the Council of the International Seabed Authority 
to consider an amendment to the Convention proposed to be 
adopted pursuant to article 314 of the Convention; or 
(B) of any other body under the Convention to consider an 
amendment that would enter into force pursuant to article 316(5) 
of the Convention; the President shall consult with the Commit-
tee on Foreign Relations of the Senate on the amendment and on 
whether the United States should object to its adoption. 
(4) All amendments to the Convention, other than amendments 
under article 316(5) of a technical or administrative nature, shall be sub-
mitted by the President to the Senate for its advice and consent. 
(5) The United States declares that it shall take all necessary steps 
under the Convention to ensure that amendments under article 316(5) 
are adopted in conformity with the treaty clause in Article II, section 2 
of the United States Constitution. 
(b) INCLUSION OF CERTAIN CONDITIONS IN INSTRUMENT 
OF RATIFICATION.—Conditions 4 and 5 shall be included in the 
States instrument of ratification to the Convention.
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